This study correlated self-report and trace data measures of political incivility. Specifically, we asked respondents to provide estimates of the degree to which they engage in uncivil political communication online. These estimates were then compared to computational measures of uncivil social media discussion behavior. The results indicated that those who self-disclose uncivil online behavior also tend to generate content on social media that is uncivil as identified by Google's Perspective application programming interface. Taken as a whole, this work suggests that combining self-report and behavioral trace data may be a fruitful means of developing multimethod measures of complex communication behaviors.
contributes to the literature in at least two ways. First, prior research on incivility has generally focused on either individual-level perceptions of uncivil communication or the degree to which deliberative spaces feature uncivil or otherwise toxic language. Missing from the literature is an assessment of the ability of online discussion participants to self-identify the degree to which they communicate in an uncivil manner. Such inquiry is important. According to Papacharissi (2004) , incivility is an intentional communication strategy that discards "the collective traditions of democracy" (p. 267) in favor of deliberate disrespect. By empirically assessing the degree to which selfreports of uncivil behavior correspond to behavioral outcomes, this work sought to arrive at a more comprehensive theoretical understanding of political incivility. Second, research in the communication sciences has increasingly adopted computational methods. While such methods allow for novel inquiry into social relations, there exists a paucity of work focusing on measurement issues, particularly as they pertain to the development of algorithms that can validly and accurately capture individual-level psychobehavioral phenomena. By combining self-reported and behavioral data, we attempted in this study to sketch logical framework that can be used for the development of trace data indicators that act as valid proxies for variables that have traditionally been captured via psychometric means. In its mature state, we believe that the here-articulated approach could be useful to researchers. Such utility might be most apparent in instances of negative communication behaviors (e.g., incivility), where self-report measures can be polluted by various forms of reporting bias and/or error.
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posited that incivility is reflected in the existence of one or more of the following components: name-calling, threats, vulgarity, foul language, xenophobia, hateful language, bigoted language, disparaging comments on the basis of ethnicity, and use of stereotypes. Sobieraj and Berry (2011) focused their construction of incivility on so-called outrage speech, including factors such as name-calling, insulting language, misrepresentation, mockery, emotional language, and ideologically extreme language. Similarly, Coe et al. (2014) operationalized incivility as existing in five distinct forms: name-calling, aspersion, lying, vulgarity, and pejorative for speech. Vargo and Hopp (2017) measured Twitter-based political incivility as language that was extreme, vulgar, abusive, or otherwise hurtful in nature. Gervais (2015a Gervais ( , 2015b ) recently used the above instances of uncivil speech to create four broad categories of incivility relevant to online communication: (1) invectives and ridicule, (2) hyperbole and distortion, (3) histrionics and obscenity, and (4) conspiracy theory.
Based on the foregoing literature, the current study conceptualized online discussion-based incivility in terms of the following observable behaviors: use of profane language, use of namecalling, use of threat, and invocation of negative stereotypes. Profanity is defined as language that is untargeted and is vulgar or crude. This dimension corresponds with the vulgarity/foul language dimensions identified by Coe et al. (2014) , Santana (2014) , and Gervais (2015b) . Name-calling corresponds with Papacharissi's (2004) definition of incivility as intentional disrespect and addresses the operationalization approaches used in Santana (2014; name-calling and abusive language), Coe et al. (2014; name-calling) , and Gervais (2015a Gervais ( , 2015b invectives and ridicule) . The threat component refers to interpersonal threats made by the communicator and addresses the threat included in Santana's (2014) operationalization of online incivility. Both Santana (2014) and Coe et al. (2014) operational definitions of incivility include factors addressing the use of negative stereotypes, disparagement on the basis of race and ethnicity, and the use of racist/bigoted language. As such, the proposed dimension (here, labeled as invocation of stereotypes) covers the use of negative group-based generalizations to categorize/label others.
The Current Study
As illustrated above, online political incivility is an important object of study. With some recent exceptions (e.g., Muddiman, 2017) , however, there exists a scarcity of research focusing specifically on the measurement of online incivility, resulting in lingering questions pertaining to the construct's theoretical properties. To that end, this study sought, in part, to offer some clarity on the subject by assessing the degree to which self-reported uncivil communication behaviors are apparent in social media users' observed online behavior by addressing the following research question:
Research Question 1:
To what degree are self-reported behaviors of online political incivility associated with observed uncivil communication behaviors on social media?
Method
Study recruitment was accomplished using Qualtrics, a national data service provider. Four sample controls were enforced: an approximate 50/50 gender split, a requirement that respondents be active users of Facebook and Twitter, a requirement that respondents be current U.S. citizens, and a requirement that respondents be 18 years or older. We also requested that participants talk about political/social issues online at least monthly; however, due to methodological limitations, this was not enforced at the point of data collection. 1 Before participating in the study, respondents were told that the purpose of the study was to learn more about how often they shared political news and information on social media. Participants were also provided with a consent form that articulated the parameters of data collection, including the following statement:
At the start of the survey you will be asked to link your Facebook and Twitter account to our survey application. This application will be used to gather posts (e.g., wall posts and tweets) that you have made on the respective services. These messages will be collected anonymously, and at no time will the researchers know your identity, or the identities of your friends.
After agreeing to the study's terms, respondents were asked to authorize a custom application that was used to harvest their Facebook and Twitter data. The application confirmed that respondents were active users of both platforms. If they did not meet the study's criteria, participation was discontinued and any collected trace data were discarded. If respondents were active users of both platforms, their data were retained and they were piped into the survey environment. Self-report and social media data were joined using an anonymous identification code that was assigned by the web application. For Facebook, we did not capture newsfeed information or friend information. For Twitter, only tweets were collected. The application conformed to both Facebook and Twitter's terms of service at the time of study execution. The project was approved by the University of Colorado's Institutional Review Board on December 21, 2016.
Measures

Self-Reported Incivility Measure
Using the dimensions identified above, a 4-item measure of incivility was constructed. All items were on 7-point semantic differential scales where 1 ¼ never and 7 ¼ very frequently. To the best of our knowledge, researchers have not previously generated/employed self-report measures of uncivil online talk. The measures employed in this study were therefore developed for the current project. All items were attached to the following introductory stem: When communicating with others on the Internet, how often do you . . . Use of profane language was assessed using the prompt "use language that is vulgar." Name-calling was measured by asking respondents to how often they "use words or terms to describe others that you would not want to be used to describe you." Threat was measured by asking respondents to indicate the frequency with which they "verbally threaten others." Finally, invocation of negative stereotypes was measured by asking respondents to estimate how often they "use negative stereotypes to describe others."
Because we were interested in exploring the incivility items both individually and as indicators of an overall composite measure, we averaged these items to form a single index of incivility (Facebook analytic sample: M ¼ 2.09, standard deviation [SD] ¼ 1.10, a ¼ .77; Twitter analytic sample: M ¼ 2.13, SD ¼ 1.15, a ¼ .77; see below for details on analytic sample construction).
Trace Incivility Measure
Coding for political talk. Because the instant treatment of incivility pertained specifically to political discussion, it was necessary to first screen for political posts. In all, the data set contained over 1.6 million messages. A supervised machine learning approach was used to identify political content. First, 100 messages were randomly chosen and annotated by two coders on whether they mentioned political talk (0 ¼ no, 1 ¼ yes).
2 Of the 100 decisions, the two coders disagreed once (pairwise agreement ¼ 99.0%; Cohen's k ¼ .80). Next, a random sample of 1,000 additional posts was then selected and distributed to the two coders. Both coders examined the posts to see whether they contained political talk. The annotations were used to build a machine learning algorithm inside of the DataRobot platform. Of the available algorithms, the AVG Blender, a neural network ensemble model, had the highest performance scores and was chosen. 3 After initial model construction, subsequent rounds of messages were randomly chosen, stratifying across prediction values, to help reinforce learning across both classes. In all, 5,006 annotations were made by the two researchers.
Performance metrics were subject to a 10-fold cross-validation, each time training on a randomly selected 64.0% (n ¼ 3,136) of the data. The final model for political talk had F 1 and AUC scores of .88 and .98, respectively, suggesting that precision and recall for the algorithm were excellent (Fawcett, 2004 ). An accuracy rate of 94.7%, a false-positive score of 3.7%, and a Matthews correlation coefficient of .85 all indicated that the algorithm distributed its misclassifications evenly and was not prone to a specific type of error (Silva, Anunciação, & Lotz, 2011) . In all, 9,838 political Facebook posts and 6,679 political Twitter posts were identified.
Annotation of incivility behaviors. Google's Perspective application programming interface (API) was used to code posts for the presence of political incivility. The API serves deep neural network-based machine learning models developed with Google's TensorFlow, a set of libraries that support the development of advanced machine learning algorithms. The Perspective API encompasses a series of algorithms designed to identify individual behaviors conceptually linked to toxic online discussion. The algorithms have been tested across multiple domains, including the comments section of The New York Times and Wikipedia's "Talk Pages." 4 Use of the Perspective API placed obvious parameters on our operationalization of incivility as it limited our analyses to behavioral (rather than intentional) aspects of incivility. However, using the available algorithms, we were able to identify four attributes that broadly corresponded to the incivility dimensions identified in the literature. The profane language dimension of incivility was assessed using the API component that targeted obscene language. The disrespect/name-calling dimension of incivility was captured using the API component that evaluated content for the presence of insulting language. The use of threatening language was coded using the API attribute that assessed the use of threat. Invocation of negative stereotypes was assessed using the API component that evaluated content for the presence of identity-based hateful language. Table 1 provides a brief description of each API component used in this study.
The perspective API was used to assign a probability value ranging from 0 (very likely to be civil) to 1 (very likely to be uncivil) for each user post across all four incivility features. To assess the accuracy of this approach, we manually evaluated a subsample of messages. Any post with a probability score on any of the four incivility attributes >.50 was classified as uncivil. Two human coders then evaluated a randomly selected sample of 600 messages (approximately 3.5% of the corpus). This sample contained 300 randomly selected messages from Facebook and 300 randomly selected messages from Twitter. The initial pairwise agreement between human coders for the entire subsample was 98.5% (Gwet's AC1 ¼ .98, 95% confidence interval (CI) ¼ [.97, .99]).
5 Disagreement between the coders was solved via discussion. Across the sample, pairwise agreement between the human-coded data and the computationally derived annotations was 95.5% (Gwet's AC1 .94, .99] ). Looking at the 27 cases in which there was humancomputer disagreement, 18 instances were API positive/human negative and 9 instances were API negative/human positive.
Having generally determined the absence of systematic or widespread error in the Perspective API's assessment of user posts, we subsequently averaged the probability scores for the posts at the user level, resulting in a raw measure describing the average probability that a given political post created by a given user contained the incivility attribute of interest.
Final trace measure construction. In the collected social media data, users were active for different periods of time. Even among those with comparable site membership durations, users posted dramatically different amounts of content. Because the annotation procedure described above simply returned the average probability that any given political post emanating from a given user contained the incivility attribute under consideration and the fact that the theoretical properties of incivility suggest that it is a purposeful and perhaps habitual mode of political discussion (Papacharissi, 2004) , we deemed it necessary to also account for the frequency with which users employed uncivil language. To accommodate this goal, we generated a weight (w) variable to adjust each raw indicator score for frequency of political communication. This weight variable was calculated as follows:
where p represents the average number of posts created by each user per year of user platform activity. Notably, p was logged because the data set contained a number of extreme outliers. To avoid log transforming a number below 1, a constant value of 1 was first added to the average number of posts generated per year of site activity. The weight variable was subsequently used as a multiplicative term, resulting in the following:
where IA k is the final computed indicator-level measure for each of the four (k) trace incivility attributes, a is the averaged probability that a random political post created by the user contains the incivility attribute of interest, and w is the weight variable. To demonstrate the effect of the w variable, Table 2 shows (as an example) the final computed values for the Facebook-derived trace profane language indicator. Specifically, in this table, we used the observed sample minimum, mean, Note. For the purposes of illustration, this table uses the raw indicator score for the Facebook-based measure of profane language. Categories represent minimum, mean, and max observed values for the w and profane language variables. As shown, the w variable functions in such a way that the final computed score is highest for frequent posters who are also high in profane language, while lower scores are assigned to those who avoid the use of profane language or post political content infrequently
and maximum values for both the raw measure of profane language and the w variable. As shown, w functions in such a way that it increases the final computed value for Facebook-based obscene language in an ordinal manner. In other words, the final computed score for the indicator increases as a function of w value strength. Conceptually, this results in a measure where those who frequently posted political content that contained uncivil sentiment received higher scores than either those who posted frequent civil content or infrequent uncivil content. This approach was deemed especially important because the self-report measures of incivility were anchored on scales where 1 ¼ never and 7 ¼ very frequently. 
Analytic Samples
Not all respondents in the primary data set generated political posts. In other cases, participants generated political content on one platform, but not on the other. As such, we constructed two analytic samples: one for those that created at least a single political post on Facebook and one for those that created at least a single political post on Twitter. Only those who provided complete survey data on the self-report incivility indicators were included in the analytic samples.
7 Descriptive statistics for the incivility variables are shown in Table 3 . Table 3 also summarizes the demographic makeup of each sample. Figures 1 and 2 show density plots for the incivility measures for both the Facebook and Twitter analytic samples.
Analytic Plan
As a first step, we examined the degree to which the self-report and trace measures corresponded to one another in a binary context. For both the self-report and trace measures, we classified any user with a score of more than 1 SD above the indicator mean as uncivil. Second, we evaluated the indicator-level associations by generating a correlation matrix using Kendall's t, a nonparametric statistic that does not assume multivariate normality. Because Pearson's r is a well-known estimate of association, we calculated the r equivalent using the equation provided by Kendall (1970; r ¼ sin[0.5 Â t Â p] ). Using the t matrix, we also generated a correlation network graph (Epskamp, Borsboom, & Fried, 2018) . Correlation networks are visual representations of correlation matrices that draw upon the human eye's ability to visually process complex information. Finally, given this work's theoretical contention that incivility is multifaceted in nature, we examined the degree to which the measures correlated with one another when considered as composites. In light of the centrality of these analyses to our ability to address the research question, we supplemented typical hypothesis testing with bootstrapped CIs. These intervals were taken at the 99th percentile and based on 5,000 bias-corrected (with replacement) resamples of the data.
Results
Facebook Analytic Sample
As shown in Table 4 , the agreement rate between the trace-classified uncivil respondents and selfidentified uncivil posters ranged from 72.6% (profane language) to 83.0% (threat). Overall agreement across all item-level indicators was 78.5%. In Table 4 , several things stand out. First, across all incivility indicators, there were a small number of instances where a case was classified as uncivil by both the user and the algorithm. Second, the disagreements followed a pattern. For profane language and name-calling, a larger percentage of the disagreements were cases where the user classified themselves as uncivil but the computer classified the user as civil. For the threat and negative stereotypes categories, this pattern was reversed: a greater percentage of the disagreements were in instances where user classified themselves as civil but the algorithm classified the user as uncivil.
Next, examination of the correlations (Table 5 and Figure 3) between the indicator-level variables showed that the self-report measures were all significantly correlated. The self-report indicators had an average interitem t value of .39 (r ¼ .57). The trace data incivility indicators were also all significantly related to each other and had an average interitem t value of .36 (r ¼ .54). Looking at the indicator associations across the self-report and trace measures, we found the existence of mostly positive relationships (average interitem t ¼ .08 [r ¼ .12]). In contrast to the method-based clusters, not all relationships were statistically significant at p < .05: Of the 16 total associations, 5 were significant at p < .05, 4 were marginally significant at p < .10, and 7 were nonsignificant. Examination of the association between the composite-level self-report and trace incivility indicators suggested the existence of a positive and weak relationship, t ¼ .12, p < . 
Twitter Analytic Sample
The agreement rate between self-classified uncivil posters and algorithmically identified uncivil posters (Table 4) ranged from 75.6% (profane language) to 78.1% (threat). The overall agreement rate was 76.7%. Looking at the disagreements, we observed a pattern identical to that found in the Facebook subsample: Respondents were more likely than the algorithm to classify themselves as uncivil for profane language and name-calling, while the algorithm was more likely than the user to classify the case as uncivil in the instances of threat and use of negative stereotypes.
A t correlation matrix (Table 6 ) and accompanying graphical model ( Figure 3 ) indicated that-as was the case for the Facebook analytic sample-the variables within each method cluster were all significantly related to one another. The average interitem t value for the self-report variables was .38 (r ¼ .56) and the average interitem t value for the trace variables was .63 (r ¼ .84). Looking across the data collection methods (i.e., examining the relationships between the self-report and trace indicators), we found that the relationships were all positive in direction. The average interitem t value was .09 (r ¼ .14). Not all of these relationships were statistically significant. Specifically, of the 16 associations, 6 were significant at p < .05, 2 were marginally significant at p < .10, and 8 were associated with p values greater than .10.
Finally, as was the case in the Facebook analytic sample, the association between the indexed measures was positive and significant, t ¼ . 
Discussion
This study set out to assess the degree to that self-reported online political incivility measures corresponded to observed online behavior. The results suggest that a self-reported inventory of online incivility frequency was positively associated with uncivil behavioral instances on both Facebook and Twitter.
Before discussing the implications of these findings, it is important to mention the limitations associated with the current study. Most notably, the observed relationships featured substantial levels of noise. And, as seen in Table 3 , the current approach predicted the absence of incivility perhaps better than the presence of incivility. The somewhat weak relationships between the selfreport and trace measures of incivility could be due to a number of factors. First, the self-report inventory was not platform-specific. Moreover, the questions were not specific to political communication, while the trace analysis focused specifically on political communication.
8 It seems plausible that a battery of platform and content-specific self-report items may have yielded stronger cross-method correlations. That said, as a proof of concept, it is perhaps in our favor that we Note. Cases were coded as uncivil if scores were more than 1 SD above the indicator's mean value. % agreement was calculated as the number of times the self-report and trace measures corresponded taken over the subsample n. Overall % agreement for Facebook ¼ 78.5% (1,387/1,768) . Overall % agreement for Twitter ¼ 76.7% (828/1,080). observed positive and statistically significant relationships between general measures of selfreported online behavior and more contextually specific measures of observed online behavior. Second, it's likely the case that both the self-report and trace data measures would benefit from additional, item-level improvement. The self-report measure was designed to somewhat generically capture the most common types of tactical incivility and was not subjected to rigorous empirical refinement. Likewise, the algorithms used to construct the trace measures were selected from an existing battery of annotation tools designed to identify a related, but distinct, social phenomenon (toxicity). Finally, most definitions of incivility involve assessment of communicator intent. For instance, Papacharissi (2004) argued that incivility is a deliberate attempt to use discursive means to undermine democratic functioning. The current study's focus on observed behavior leaves us generally blind to the motivations that animate uncivil behavior on social media. Despite these limitations, we believe important implications stem from the current data. We found that incivility was relatively rare in occurrence (see Figure 1 and 2 and Table 3 ). Both measurement approaches indicated that most people did not habitually engage in uncivil political communication online. When incivility was employed, the results suggested that there exists some congruence between approximated recollections of communication habits and manifest behavior. Localized to the context of online political incivility, our results conform with prior theorizing that suggests incivility is a conscious act to disrespect those perceived as oppositional others when conducting political discussion (e.g., Papacharissi, 2004) . In other words, the ability of .07 Name-calling (self-report) [2] .59 -.39 .48 .12y .15 .13 .14 Threat (self-report) [3] . communicators to identify and accurately self-report uncivil communication behaviors provides substantial support for the notion that incivility is not rudeness borne from a spontaneous affective response, but, instead, a deliberate (and perhaps habitual) communication tactic that is centered on the disrespect of others. Our data also provide some indication that incivility features may cluster together. For example, as seen in Figure 3 , the self-reported use of name-calling and the self-reported use negative stereotypes were strongly correlated with each other across both platforms. Likewise, across both platforms, the trace measures of name-calling and invocation of negative stereotypes were robustly associated. Conversely, our data provide some evidence that profane language may not necessarily be deployed in conjunction with other forms of incivility. In other words, within both the self-report and trace-based measures of incivility, profane language-when compared to the other incivility features-had comparatively small average interitem correlation values. This pattern held across both platforms. The idea that users may employ incivility repertoires may help explain some of the low correlations between indicators. These weak relationships may be especially apparent when assessing associations across the self-report and trace measures due to the absence of common method bias. These findings also suggest that incivility might be best understood as a secondorder construct that is reflected in multiple first-order variable clusters.
The current data also offer potentially valuable insights as they pertain to human response errors. As shown in Table 3 , in the cases of profane language and name-calling, respondents were likely to overreport engaging in the behavior (relative to the algorithmic classification). Given that profanity and name-calling are both relatively common social behaviors that are infrequently governed by strong social sanction, it may be the case the discrepancy between reported and observed levels of behavior is related to recall bias or the failure to accurately recall the degree to which one demonstrates a given behavior. As illustrated by Tourangeau (2000) , routine behaviors may simply go unnoticed and therefore never become encoded into memory. Alternately, participants were comparatively more likely to underreport engaging the use of threatening language and the use of negative stereotypes. Verbal threats and the use of identity-based hate language are often governed by meaningful social (and sometimes legal) sanction. For this reason, it may be the case that the participant responses were subject to social desirability bias, or the "tendency to present one's self in the best possible light," which can result in the systematic bias of data in the direction of what is "correct or socially acceptable" (Fisher, 1993, p. 303) . These findings are important because they suggest that theoretical concepts that are reflected by a variety of behavioral or cognitive features may be internally subject to different sources of error. In this way, computational measures of behavior may be especially valuable because they do not rely on memory-based or socially influenced reporting process. At the same time, algorithmically based behavioral measures are subject to the biases present in their human creators and can also be negatively influenced by sources of systematic internal error (e.g., inability to detect complex forms of social communication). Despite these issues, we believe that studies that draw upon multiple data sources may be key in the development of algorithmic tools that present accurate and comparatively unbiased renderings of human behavior. We should, however, note that the dichotomization process used in Table 3 was rough in nature and that caution should be taken when interpreting the presented results.
Conclusion
In this study, we identified statistically significant and positive relationships between self-reported and behavioral measures of online political incivility. While these findings are theoretically meaningful, the overarching intent of this work was not necessarily or solely to present a finalized trace measure of online political incivility. Instead, we also sought to use this exploratory investigation as proof of concept that can potentially be used by future researchers to develop valid and reliable measures of online communication behaviors. Based on this experience, we have five suggestions for future research. Three of these suggestions are specific to the future study of incivility and two of these suggestions relate more generally to work that seeks to combine survey and trace data. As it pertains to the former, our first recommendation is that researchers build upon these findings to continue the work of developing a trace data measure of online political incivility. The results here are a starting, rather than ending, point. Second, we urge researchers to develop a more comprehensive and more rigorously developed self-report index of online political incivility. It is likely the case that the inventory used here would benefit from additional items and in-depth analysis of the dimensional structure of these items. Third, upon completion of these two tasks, researchers could extend the current methodological approach to better understand the motivations that underlie uncivil political communication. Looking beyond the study of incivility, our first suggestion for future research is to explicitly lay out the costs and benefits of using commercially developed computational tools relative to the use of academic tools developed for specific research problems. On one hand, commercially developed tools often are the result of resource-intensive developmental efforts. And, their (comparatively) broad accessibility may be attractive to researchers who do not have formal training in the computational social sciences. At the same time, these tools often have to be retrofitted to address specific research questions and may, therefore, have conceptual limitations. Second, researchers should better define ethical practices for studies that involve the collection of both survey and trace data. As an emergent methodological approach, there do not yet exist best practices guiding critical issues such as consent statement construction and means by which raw replication data can be publicly furnished without violating platform terms of service statements. models can deliver superior classification due to their ability to leverage multiple machine learning models at once. 4. For application programming interface (API) documentation, visit https://github.com/conversationai/ perspectiveapi 5. Given the low prevalence of uncivil posts, we report Gwet's AC1 rather than more commonly reported reliability measures (e.g., Cohen's k). When feature prevalence is very low, Cohen's k (and similar indexes) has been shown to result in downwardly biased reliability estimates (Wongpakaran, Wongpakaran, Wedding, & Gwet, 2013) . 6. To further delineate the need for weighting, consider Respondent A who posts a single, very uncivil political comment (probability score ¼ 1.00). Contrast this with Respondent B, who posts 20 political comments containing high levels of incivility (average probability score ¼ .95). If we simply employed user-level averages, Respondent A would be assessed as more uncivil than Respondent B, despite the fact that Respondent B likely exerts a more toxic influence on her or his discussion environment(s). In an even more extreme case, compare Respondent A to Respondent C, who posts 100 political comments all of which are assigned an incivility score of 1. The simple application of user-level averages would have resulted in the classification of Respondents A and B as equally uncivil. 7. A total of 204 participants created at least one political post on both platforms. 8. Participants were not required to actively engage in political discussion to be included in the sample. Thus, to preserve face validity of the questions, we oriented them toward online communication in general.
